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CHAPTER NINE 
PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT 
TO ONE'S IMAGE 
A Cultural and Legal History 
Samantha Barbas 
After receiving calls from her neighbors, a woman found that her 
daughter's picture had been used in an ad for a local ice cream store, 
without the daughter's or the mother's consent. Her daughter had sim-
ply "liked" the ice cream store on Facebook. The woman was outraged 
and embarrassed. People across the country whose photographs had 
been similarly exploited under Facebook's Sponsored Stories advertis-
ing program sued Facebook (Henn 2013 ). 
In 1948, the Saturday Evening Post ran a critique of cab drivers 
in Washington, DC that accused them of cheating their customers. 
A photograph appeared with the article that depicted a woman cab 
driver, Muriel Peay, talking to the article's author on the street. The 
caption did not name her, and the article did not refer to her. Although 
the woman consented to be photographed, she did not know that the 
picture would be used in an article on cheating cabbies. She was humil-
iated, and she sued the magazine. 1 
Angry and insulted, these individuals could have done any number 
of things to address their sense of injury and violation. They chose 
to sue. In the past hundred years, in increasing number, Americans 
have turned to the law to help them defend their reputations and 
public images. The twentieth century saw the creation of what I 
describe as a law of public image, and the phenomenon of personal 
image litigation. 
1 Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948). 
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Under these laws of image, you can sue if you've been depicted in an 
embarrassing manner, even if no one thinks less of you for it. If a news-
paper or website publishes your picture in a way you find offensive, you 
can, under certain circumstances, receive monetary damages for your 
sense of affront - for the outrage that someone has taken liberties with 
your public image and interfered with the way you want to be known 
to others. These "laws of image" consist principally of the tort actions 
for invasion of privacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
One's image or public image, as I define it, is one's public face, the per-
sona one projects to the world through such external signs and attrib-
utes as one's gestures, speech, dress, and social behavior. An image· 
is something that one has, and that one creates: it is our conscious 
extemalization of self. Image overlaps with, but is distinct from reputa· 
tion, which is an external judgment - how other people see you. Image 
law protects both the right to a good reputation and the right to one's 
image - the right to control one's public image and to feel good about 
one's public presentation of self. 
These laws of image are a modem invention, created to address con-
ceptions of the self and personal injury that have become dominant in 
the United States in the past hundred years. This essay explores the 
origins of these laws of image, tracing them to the rise of what I describe 
as an image-conscious self, the modal self of our mass-mediated, mass 
consumer society. The laws of image are an expression of a people who 
have become fascinated - even obsessed - with their personal images; 
who have come to see their images as coextensive with their identities, 
so that an injury to one's image constitutes an injury to one's self. 
*** 
The story begins at the end of the nineteenth century, with the rise of 
major urban centers in the United States. In 1860, only 20 percent of 
the population lived in towns of 2,500 or more. By 1900, a third of the 
population lived in towns and cities. Between 1860 and 1910, America's 
urban population increased sevenfold (Hofstadter 1955: 173). 
The process of urbanization unsettled long-established ways of cre-
ating a social self. In small towns and villages, a person's social identity 
had been a product of ongoing interactions with a known and familiar 
community. While reputations and social identities were by no means 
unchangeable, they were somewhat fixed. The collective memory in 
203 
SAMANTHA BARBAS 
small communities was strong, and a person "knows better than to sup-
pose that he can deceive [others] into thinking that he is something 
radically different from what he is" (Blumenthal1932: 44). 
By contrast, in the cities, surrounded by strangers, one's social iden-
tity was more often a function of first impressions rather than con-
tinued contact. While in a small community there was little need for 
an individual to carefully "signal" herself- to display her background, 
beliefs, and social status on the surface of her appearance- the more 
socially fluid and fragmented conditions of city life demanded that peo-
ple externalize their identities. As sociologist George Simmel observed 
in 1903, the "brevity and rarity" of meetings between individuals on 
the streets and other urban venues created a desire to "make oneself 
noticeable" upon first glance, to distinguish oneself through one's 
manners, looks, and gestures (Simmel1950: 421). 
The heightened importance of surfaces and first impressions led to 
increased attention to the presentation of self in public. In the cit-
ies and large towns of the late nineteenth century, there was a new 
preoccupation with mastering and perfecting one's social appearance. 
"Impression management," to use sociologist Erving Goffman's phrase, 
became an important personal project and goal (Goffman 1955). 
People began to speak of life in theatrical metaphors - of social exist-
ence as an "act" on a "stage." One "performed" one's identity, went out 
in public to "see and be seen." It was thought that these "presentational 
performances" required proper costume, diction, and gestures; advice 
and etiquette books, with elaborate instructions on how to dress, how 
to greet people, and what to say in public, were issued at an unprece-
dented rate (Schlesinger 1946: 35). 
Technological and industrial developments enhanced this attentive-
ness to self-presentation in public. Portrait photography was becoming 
popular, and mass-produced clothing, ubiquitous by the 1890s, put a 
fashionable appearance within the reach of the ordinary consumer 
(Schorman 2003: 13). Advertisements encouraged people to scruti-
nize their appearances and to purchase items that would help them 
enhance their looks and images. While public visibility had always 
been an essential part of life for the famous, the notion that "everyone 
could and should be looked at" was a novel, modern concept (Braudy 
1997: 506). 
By the late nineteenth century, individuals across the social 
spectrum were being encouraged to cultivate an attitude toward their 
bodies, appearances, and feelings that was strategic and instrumental. 
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They were adopting an external perspective on themselves, considering 
how they might appear before strangers, and seeing themselves as images 
in the eyes of others (Kasson 1991: 114). There was to be a reward for this 
scrupulous management of personal image - respect, upward mobility, 
and the possibility of social and material success. Especially in the new 
urban centers, where social hierarchies were unstable, it was thought that 
the "self-made" man could create a new identity and advance socially by 
appearing more refined and genteel than he really was. 
To be clear: people were not becoming "superficial." We can see, 
nonetheless, a new attentiveness to public images, and to potential 
threats to those images. John Kasson, in his history of urban life and 
manners in the nineteenth century, has noted the great fear in this 
time of being discredited and "exposed"- that nosy neighbors, gossip-
ing houseguests, and whispering co-workers might reveal the "truth" 
behind one's social fa<;ade (Kasson 1991: 114). The mass media were 
posing especially formidable threats to personal image, threats that the 
average citizen was seemingly helpless to control, manage, or defend 
against. 
*** 
In the late 1800s, with urbanization, an expanding audience for pub-
lications, and advances in publishing technology, a massive volume of 
printed material flooded the market. Mass-circulation magazines such 
as the Ladies' Home Journal debuted and became popular (Kaestle and 
Radway 2009: 57, 60-1). Total national circulation of monthly maga-
zines rose from 18 million in 1890 to 64 million in 1905- nearly four 
magazines per American household (ibid.: 103 ). Newspaper readership 
increased 400 percent between 1870 and 1900, and the number of 
newspapers doubled (Pember 1972: 10). 
In the early 1800s, the typical subject of press coverage had been the 
activities of "public figures" - politicians, public officials, captains of 
industry. Publishers eventually realized that "human interest" stories -
"chatty little reports of tragic or comic incidents in the lives of the 
people" - attracted more readers than dry copy about the comings and 
goings of officials and statesmen (Hughes 1940, Dicken Garcia 1989: 
64 ). Crimes, love affairs, divorces, holidays, social outings, illnesses, 
births, deaths - matters of ordinary existence were scooped out of 
neighborhoods by aggressive "roving reporters" and fed to a curious 
public. "The interest in other people's affairs in this country is almost 
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measureless," observed the Outlook magazine in 1896. "The morning 
and evening papers make us feel as if we belonged to a great village 
and ... as if our chief interest lay in what is going on at the other end 
of the street" (The Passion for Publicity 1896: 738). In the 1880s 
and 1890s, several states proposed and passed laws providing for civil 
liability or criminal punishment for sensational press content. 2 There 
was also a turn to the tort of libel. 
For centuries, the twin torts of defamation - libel and slander - had 
protected reputations against scandalous falsehoods. One's reputation 
is one's good name among one's peers - the "estimate in which he is 
held by the public in the place he is known."3 In order to be legally 
actionable as a libel or slander, a statement had to be both defamatory 
and false. A defamatory statement was one that seriously lowered a 
person's esteem in his community: it "expose[d] a person to hatred or 
contempt ... injure[ d) him in his profession or trade, [and] cause[d] him 
to be shunned by his neighbors" (Odgers 1887: 19). The rise of the 
sensationalistic press and "human interest" journalism led to a surge 
in libel lawsuits. In his study of tort litigation in turn of the century 
New York, Randall Bergstrom found that the number of libel cases 
before the New York Supreme Court increased by over twenty times 
between 1870 and 1910 (Bergstrom 1992: 20). Francis Laurent's study 
of a trial court in Wisconsin showed a significant increase in libel 
cases between 1875 and 1914, most of them against local newspapers 
(Laurent 1959:49, 164). 
Initiating a lawsuit is, inevitably, an assertion of rights. When plain-
tiffs commenced a libel lawsuit, they were claiming, in effect, that they 
had a legal entitlement to their reputations. There was nothing novel 
about this. In theory, the common law had always protected reputa-
tion. Yet the fact that more people were claiming the right- that men 
and women across the social spectrum felt compelled to bring libel 
lawsuits - suggests not only that people saw their public images and 
reputations as being especially imperiled, but also that those aspects of 
the self had become more valuable and treasured. A good reputation 
was a sign of virtue and rectitude; it was also critical to socioeconomic 
mobility in the late 1800s, a time of greatly expanding opportunities 
2 Several states passed laws that prohibited the publication of "criminal news, police 
reports ... or accounts of ... bloodshed, lust, or crime." See Winters v. New York, 333 
u.s. 507 (1948). 
3 Cooper v. Greeley & McElrath, 1 Denio, 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845). 
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for social advancement. There was another reason for this protective-
ness of reputation - Americans' increasing image-consciousness, their 
attunement to social appearances and the impressions they made in the 
eyes of others. 
*** 
Defamation law dealt with false statements that lowered one's standing 
among one's peers. It did not always or adequately address the prob-
lem of media "gossip" -facts that were often true, and that did not 
necessarily injure reputation, but nonetheless caused humiliation and 
distress. The search for legal remedies for the gossip problem led to the 
invention of the legal "right to privacy," credited to the famous 1890 
Harvard Law Review article "The Right to Privacy." 
The article, by the future Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis and 
his colleague Samuel Warren, attacked gossip columns and informa-
tion about personal affairs "spread broadcast in the columns of the daily 
papers." "Persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate 
concerns" were "being dragged into an undesirable and undesired pub-
licity" (Brandeis and Warren 1890: 193 ). To a dignified person seeking 
respect and status, having the details of one's personal life publicized 
in the press caused embarrassment and "mental pain and distress," "far 
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury" (ibid.: 214). 
The article accused the press of "invading privacy" when it revealed 
a person's emotions, activities, and personal idiosyncrasies before a 
public audience, even though such matters were not "private," in the 
sense of being secret or concealed. Newspapers could "invade privacy" 
when they published a person's photograph, even if it was taken at a 
public event, or when they described one's participation in social activ-
ities such as weddings or balls. The article discussed the recent case of 
Manola v. Stevens, involving flash photographs of an actress obtained 
without her permission as she appeared on the stage (Brandeis and 
Warren 1890: 195). The description of a woman at a social gathering 
was technically not "private," nor were pictures of an actress perform-
ing in public. These publications were nonetheless said to "invade pri-
vacy" because in presenting the subject out of context, and before an 
audience not of her own choosing, they impaired her ability to create 
her own social identity, to define her public image as she wished. 
Brandeis and Warren proposed a common law cause of action that 
would allow the victims of such "invasions of privacy" to sue and 
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recover monetary damages (Brandeis and Warren 1890: 219). Unlike 
libel, their tort of invasion of privacy did not protect a person's esteem 
in the eyes of others so much as one's capacity to define his own public 
persona: "the right of determining ... to what extent his thoughts, sen-
timents, and emotions shall be communicated to others" (ibid.: 198). 
The right to privacy was the right to keep one's personal affairs out of 
the public eye, and more broadly, to determine one's own public image 
without undue interference from the mass media: A manifestation of 
the emerging image consciousness of the time, it was the right to con-
trol one's public image and to receive damages for injuries to one's feel-
ings about one's image. By 1910, eight states had recognized a "right to 
privacy" as a right to control one's public image and to protect one's 
image against unwanted, humiliating media depictions.4 
*** 
As the image-conscious sensibility gained purchase on the popu-
lar imagination in the twentieth century, and the mass media posed 
ongoing threats to people's public images, existing areas of law were 
expanded and new laws created to protect what was being described 
as a right to one's public image. In the 1930s and 1940s, a majority 
of states recognized the tort right to privacy, described as a right to 
avoid undesirable and "unwarranted publicity."5 Libel claims increased, 
and courts expanded libel doctrine to reach a wider range of emotional 
harms and image-based harms. In a number of different contexts, courts 
were recognizing a right to one's image, and the personal image lawsuit 
became a fixture of American legal culture. 
*** 
In the first few decades of the twentieth century, the United States 
became an image society, marked by an escalating cultural emphasis on 
images, surfaces, and social appearances. An especially intense brand 
4 At common law: Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); 
Pritchett v. Knox Cty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 85 N.E. 32 (Ind. App. 1908); Foster-Millburn 
Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909), appeal after remand, 127 S.W. 476 (Ky. 1910); 
Schulman v. Whital<er, 39 So. 737 (La. 1906); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 A. 97 (N.J. E. 
and A. 1907). By statute: New York, 1903, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law§ 50; Utah, 1909, 
Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-4-8 and 76-4-9; Virginia, 1904, Va. Code Ann.§ 8-650. 
5 Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (C.A. 2d Cir. 1940). 
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of image consciousness took root in the 1920s, a decade that is often 
described by historians as the first "modem" decade in US history-
one that saw the rise of a mass society, the mass media, mass-marketed 
products, and increasing cultural standardization and homogeneity 
(see Dumenil1995). 
In 1920, the census registered, for the first time, more Americans 
living in cities than in rural areas (McNeese and Jensen 2010: 107). 
As sociologists Robert Park and Ernest Burgess wrote in their 1925 
study The City, the contacts of the city might have been face-to-face, 
"but they are ... superficial, transitory, and segmental" (Wirth 1938: 
12). The perceived depersonalization of daily life, and the superficial-
ity of social exchange, produced something of an existential crisis fo'r 
Americans in this time. American culture became preoccupied with 
the dilemma of personal distinction- the difficulty of "standing out 
from the crowd." How could one preserve a sense of self amidst a sea of 
strangers? The answer posed by advertisers, personnel managers, psy-
chologists and other cultural arbiters lay in personal image - a distinc-
tive appearance, "magnetic personality," and pleasing first impression. 
A "winning image" was one that was so stunning and unforgettable -so 
charismatic and appealing - as to secure for a person instant notice. 
As a practical matter, the cultivation of a positive image had practi-
cal application in many areas of life in which the rise of a mass society 
and constant interaction with strangers posed very real and tangible 
problems of distinction and recognition. One domain in which the 
positive image and first impression was coming to be seen a critical 
asset was the burgeoning white-collar sector of the economy- business, 
sales, and customer relations. Success in these areas, it was said, hinged 
on the ability to cultivate a pleasing image - on "salesmanship," "peo-
ple skills," and brand recognition. The basis of effective selling was 
the positive first impression - creating a desirable image of a product 
and, even more, of the salesperson. Before long, the imperatives of the 
world of sales and service were applied to social relations more gener-
ally. The efforts of salespeople to sell products to skeptical customers 
became a metaphor for the social struggle waged by every person in an 
effort to distinguish themselves in the modem world. Attracting the 
attention and positive regard of strangers, the basis of success in any 
pursuit, demanded that an individual put forth an ideal impression on 
the first try. 
The relatively new advertising industry, in conjunction with the 
new field of popular psychology, promised individuals that they could 
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use conspicuous consumption and the strategic display of goods to 
achieve a stunning image, distinguish themselves from the crowd, 
and "win friends and influence people" (Carnegie, Carnegie, and Pell 
1936). Advertisers heightened concerns with personal image; the mis-
sion of the ad agency was to create discomforts and dissatisfactions with 
one's image that could only be assuaged through purchasing goods. 
Advertisers encouraged consumers to see themselves through the 
searching gaze of strangers who needed to be persuaded or impressed. 
"Do you wonder, when you meet a casual friend, whether your nose 
is shiny?" asked an ad for Woodbury's Soap. "Do you anxiously con-
sult store windows and vanity cases at every opportunity?" (Peiss 1998: 
142). Ads played upon popular insecurities with identity and appear-
ance, and they reinforced the perception that images were essential to 
social advancement (Marchand 1986: 14). 
The 1920s gave rise to a new, defining phenomenon of American 
society, perhaps the single greatest force behind the new culture 
of images - the entertainment celebrity. The United States became 
a "celebrity culture." Film actors, who had seemingly mastered the 
art of "impression management," became role models and cultural 
heroes. Audiences were fascinated with the way film actors put them-
selves together - how they created a stunning image and constantly 
manipulated that image to please, amuse, and fascinate others. In the 
image-conscious culture, the actor had become the modal self. 
*** 
In the period between the two world wars, the mass media suffused 
and transformed American life. Daily newspaper circulation increased 
.from 22.4 million copies in 1910 to 39.6 million copies in the 1930s. 
Ninety percent of Americans were estimated to be newspaper readers 
(Lee 1947: 731). Nearly 4,500 periodicals were published each year 
in the 1930s and circulated a combined 180 million copies per issue 
(K yvig 2004: 190-1). By the end of the decade, half the homes in the 
United States contained at least two radios, which were on for about 
five hours a day (Cashman 1989). 
The proliferation of mass communications brought more injuries to 
public images and reputations, and with them, the continued expansion 
of libel law and litigation. As soon as radio and motion pictures were 
popularized, their creators were sued for libel. The threat of libel litiga-
tion had become so significant that major newspapers, magazines, and 
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book publishing houses retained libel lawyers for prepublication review, 
and insurance organizations began writing libel and slander insurance 
for publishers and broadcasters (Berger 1937, Thayer 1943: 340). 
Libel doctrine transformed and expanded to meet the demands 
of the image-conscious society. In the 1930s and 1940s, courts were 
broadening the definition of a defamatory publication. A defamatory 
publication was not only one that cast a person into disrepute. A pub-
lication could be defamatory if it tarnished a person's reputation or 
image in his own eyes, causing mental distress (Wade 1962: 1093-5). In 
1935, the torts scholar Calvert Magruder noted an increasing number 
of libel cases where plaintiffs had won damages, not for an objective 
loss of reputation, but for "the sense of outrage and chagrin that the 
defendant should have made an attack upon his reputation" (Magruder 
1935: 1055). Courts were turning their focus from external, interper-
sonal relations inward, to the realm of one's self-perception and one's 
feelings about one's public image. 
Thus it was that a court held that a woman had a cause of action 
for libel when a newspaper said that she had been served with pro-
cess while sitting in a bathtub - an accusation that did not impute 
immoral conduct or likely damage her reputation, but nonetheless 
embarrassed her.6 In Zbyszko v. New York American, from 1930, the 
newspaper had published an article on the theory of evolution. In one 
part of the article, the text read: "The Gorilla is probably closer to 
man, both in body and in brain, than any other species of ape now 
alive. The general physique of the Gorilla is closely similar to an ath-
letic man of today, and the mind of a young gorilla is much like the 
mind of a human baby." Near that text appeared a photograph of the 
wrestler Stanislaus Zbyszko, in a wrestling pose, and under it a cap-
tion: "Stanislaus Zbyszko, the Wrestler, Not Fundamentally Different 
from the Gorilla in Physique."7 Though it was unlikely that any reader 
would think worse of the wrestler for this, the jury sympathized with his 
sense of affront and awarded him $25,000 (A Collect As You Go Tour 
of the Publisher's Chain 1936: 50). 
The major development in image law was the growing recognition of 
the tort of invasion of privacy. By 1940 the privacy tort, as a right to con-
trol one's public image, had been recognized in at least fifteen jurisdictions 
(Nizer 1940: 526, 536). The Restatement of Torts acknowledged the tort in 
6 Snyder v. New York Press Co., 137 A.D. 291, 121 N.Y.S. 944 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910). 
7 Zbyszko v. New York American, 228 A.D. 277, 239 N.Y.S. 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930). 
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1939: "a person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's 
interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited 
to the public is liable to the other," read its summation (American Law 
Institute 1939: 389). At a time of great public criticism of media inva-
sions of privacy, and increasing cultural demands to control and perfect 
one's public image, there was much popular support for the privacy tort. 
Media audiences wanted to gawk, to peer in on others' lives, even to be 
voyeurs, but were upset when the gaze was turned back on them. 
It was not total solitude, concealment, or anonymity that people 
seemed to want, but rather selective self-exposure. In an age when actors 
and other performers were seen as cultural heroes, celebrated for their 
personal lifestyles, publicity of one's private affairs was not always unwel-
come, intrusive, or annoying. In a celebrity culture, being thrust into 
the spotlight for one's proverbial15 minutes of notoriety was, for some, 
an appealing possibility. Many of the "gregarious millions," "crave to be 
lifted out of the morass of anonymity," and believed that "any publicity, 
even though unfavorable, is better than none at all" (Ragland 1928: 87). 
Regardless of whether one sought fame or was content in the confines 
of a narrower world, control over one's publicity and public image -
the ability to put one's own "spin" on one's persona- was seen as crit-
ical. Writers discussed the importance of a broad legal right to control 
one's image, a right to create one's image on one's own terms. In the 
face of "multiplying hordes of newsmongers," a "right to privacy" was 
essential (Levy 1935: 190). 
*** 
A few privacy cases from this time involved the publication of deeply 
intimate, personal material. In 1939, Time magazine published an arti-
cle titled "Starving Glutton," about a woman who had a metabolic 
disorder that led her to eat huge quantities without gaining weight. 
The picture published with the article, taken by a reporter over the 
woman's protests, showed Dorothy Barber in bed in a long-sleeved hos-
pital gown. She sued for invasion of privacy and won damages at trial. 
"Certainly if there is any right of privacy at all, it should include the 
right to obtain medical treatment at home or in a hospital for an indi-
vidual personal condition ... without personal publicity," an appeals 
court concluded, upholding the judgment.8 
8 Barberv. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942). 
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The majority of privacy cases did not involve publications that 
were especially private, however. Truly intimate depictions - deeply 
personal gossip, explicit stories about people's romantic affairs, lurid 
photographs - were typically not the subject of lawsuits; legal action 
would only attract further attention to the sensitive, embarrassing 
material (Dawson 1948: 39). Instead, most privacy cases involved situ-
ations where people had been presented in a manner they found unfa-
vorable, misrepresentative, upsetting, or annoying, even though the 
activities portrayed were not especially scandalous, personal or secret. 
A number of privacy suits, for example, involved photographs of a per-
son taken on the street and published without consent. In these cases, 
the law of privacy had very little to do with "privacy." No exposure 
of "private life" had occurred. Rather, the right to privacy was a right 
to not be depicted in a fashion that contradicted one's own, desired 
self-presentation, "under circumstances which are complimentary as 
well as those which are critical."9 "Privacy" was about the right to 
choose one's own audiences, about shielding people from unwanted 
publicity that clashed with how they wanted to be known to the public. 
In the 1929 case ]ones v. Herald Post, a woman named Lillian Jones 
witnessed her husband assaulted and stabbed to death on the street, 
and tried to fight back against the attackers. She sued for invasion of 
privacy when the Louisville Herald Post published her picture with a 
truthful account of her heroic efforts. She claimed that the publication 
was offensive to her. In Hillman v. Star Publishing, a woman sued the 
Seattle Star for invasion of privacy when it ran her photo along with 
an article about her father's arrest for mail fraud. She claimed that this 
caused her "shame, humiliation, and a sense of disgrace."10 
The plaintiff in Blumenthal v. Picture Classics was an "elderly and 
respectable" woman, a bread vendor, who sued over newsreel footage 
that depicted her selling her wares on the streets of the lower East Side. 
The footage was a candid, unaltered street scene, part of a newsreel 
titled "Sight Seeing in New York with Nick and Tony." The woman 
complained that the portrayal was "foolish, unnatural, and undigni-
fied," and an "invasion of privacy." A trial court issued an injunction 
restraining the distribution of the newsreel.U In Sweenek v. Pathe News, 
9 Hull v. Curtis Pub. Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956). 
10 Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wn. 691, 117 P. 594 (1911). 
11 Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y.S. 800 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1932). 
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from 1936, a woman claimed that unauthorized newsreel footage taken 
of her in an exercise course for overweight women - "a group of cor-
pulent women attempting to reduce with the aid of some rather novel 
and unique apparatus" -was an invasion of privacy because the footage 
was embarrassing. 
Some of these lawsuits- though certainly not all- could be described 
as fairly petty. The law professor Harry Kalven, Jr believed that most 
parties who came forward with privacy claims had "shabby, unseemly 
grievances and an interest in exploitation." "I suspect that the fasci-
nation with the great Brandeis trade mark, excitement over the law 
at a point of growth, and appreciation of privacy as a key value have 
combined to dull the normal critical sense of judges and commentators 
and have caused them not to see the pettiness of the tort they have 
sponsored," he wrote in an article titled "Privacy in Tort Law- Were 
Brandeis and Warren Wrong?" (Kalven 1966: 332). 
Even the most seemingly 'thin-skinned' of these plaintiffs were not 
necessarily insincere or duplicitous, however. Although we can't know 
for sure, the men and women presented in an inaccurate or otherwise 
displeasing manner in various newsreels, comic strips, and articles may 
well have been hurt. This sense of injury and affront is a testament to 
the image consciousness of the time. It is only in a culture where people 
feel deeply possessive and protective of their public images that such 
misrepresentations, even if objectively benign, will be experienced as 
serious harms. h is only in a culture that has invested great importance 
in images, that has freighted public images with such emotional and 
psychological weight, that the law will recognize such harms and take 
them seriously. The law tracked the growing cultural focus on personal 
image, and in recognizing these "privacy" claims as worthy of judicial 
attention, and in some cases monetary judgments, courts validated, 
even heightened the image-conscious sensibility. 
*** 
Sympathetic to the importance of public image, and plaintiffs' interests 
in controlling and shaping their public personae, courts provided relief 
in a number of these cases. Yet at the same time as the courts were 
recognizing a right to one's image that made embarrassing or distress-
ing media representations legally actionable, they were also acknowl-
edging another kind of image right: the rights of publishers, writers, 
and filmmakers to depict people's likenesses and life stories, and the 
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public's right to consume them. In a culture where politics and social 
life were being transacted through images, where media images had 
become the conunon currency of social exchange, the ability to freely 
depict individuals and public affairs was critical to the "free and robust'' 
public discourse that was beginning to be described as a central value 
of the First Amendment. By the 1940s, imposing liability for truthful 
commentary about a person, even if distressing to him, was coming ·to 
be seen as a form of state control over expression that smacked of the 
totalitarian governments in Europe and Asia against which the United 
States was at war. 
Brandeis and Warren and courts adjudicating early twentieth-
century privacy cases had recognized a privilege that would exempt the 
publication of "matters of public interest," or "matters of public con-
cern." Before the 1930s, the definition of a "matter of public concern" 
had been narrow. What was a matter of "public concern" or "public 
interest" was not what actually interested the public- for then gossip 
and sensationalism might be immune -but rather, what judges believed 
that the public should know, in its own best interest. In the 1930s and 
1940s, courts began to expand the "matters of public interest" privilege. 
Purely entertaining, titillating publications, such as a highly dramatized 
account of a criminal trial, gossip columns, and even murder myster-
ies were said to be matters of legitimate "public interest" or "public 
concern" that could be written about freely, even if the individuals 
involved were unwilling to be publicized.12 For judges to create their 
own definition of "matters of public interest," one that overrode the 
media's publishing decisions and implicitly, the public's consumption 
choices, was to some courts an impermissible censorship of the press. 
Because there was great curiosity about public figures' private 
lives, their personal affairs were usually "matters of public interest," 
said courts. As such, public figures - defined as those who submitted 
themselves to "public approval" - had very little in the way of privacy 
(American Law Institute 1939). According to some courts, even ordi-
nary people "waived" their right to privacy when they went into public 
places, or were involved in "matters of public interest" (ibid.). In Jones 
v. Herald Post, involving the woman who tried to attack her husband's 
murderer, the court concluded that the woman had, albeit unwillingly, 
12 Colyer c. Richard K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 A.D. 297, 146 N.Y.S. 999 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1914); Elmhurstv. Pearson, 80U.S.App. D.C. 372,153 F.2d467 (1946); Middleton v. 
News Syndicate Co., 162 Misc. 516, 295 N.Y.S. 120 (N.Y. Misc. 1937). 
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become an "innocent actor in a great tragedy in which the public had a 
deep concern," and as such, it was not an invasion of privacy to publish 
her photograph.13 Insofar as they generated public interest or curiosity, 
there was "no invasion of a right of privacy in the description of the 
ordinary goings and comings of a person or of weddings, even though 
intended to be entirely private."14 
Not everyone in the legal world endorsed this expansive view of 
privileged material. To some, the public's interest in learning about 
people and public affairs, and the right of the press to convey that infor-
mation, did not justify interfering with a person's public image when 
that interference created serious emotional or psychic harm. There was 
a battle underway. The ideals of modem expressive freedom cut both 
ways: liberty meant the right to express oneself through one's image, 
and at the same time, the freedom to make images of others. This ten-
sion would trouble courts, lawyers, legal theorists, and the public in the 
coming decades. When were the media justified in overriding people's 
right to create their own images? Could the right to one's image and the 
freedom to image be reconciled? 
*** 
In the post-Second World War era, courts imposed further limitations 
on the image torts in the name of freedom of speech and the public's 
"right to know." Despite this, the proliferation of the media, new com-
munication technologies, and a cultural focus on personal images and 
"image management" led to the significant growth of image law and 
personal image litigation. There was deep cultural confusion around 
image laws and image rights. At the same time that the laws of image 
were being narrowed, they expanded to accommodate people's increas-
ing protectiveness of their public images in an image-saturated society, 
what was being described as an "age of images" (Boorstin 1962). 
*** 
In postwar America, images - of affluence, desire, mobility, and fame -
"reached ... into every comer of our daily lives," observed historian 
Daniel Boorstin (1962: 249). The Second World War had brought 
13 ]ones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (Ky Ct. App. 1929). 
14 Barberv. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942). 
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with it unprecedented prosperity, and the middle-class lifestyle came 
within the reach of millions. By the end of the 1950s, most families 
owned their homes, their cars, and a television set. It was a culture 
of appearance and aspiration; advertising in glossy magazines and on 
television spread bright pictures of consumer products and their happy 
users for envy and emulation. 
In his landmark work The Lonely Crowd, sociologist David Riesman 
wrote of the rise of a new personality type that was emerging as an "influ-
ential minority" in "contemporary, highly industrialized, and bureau-
cratic America," particularly among "the upper middle-class of our 
larger cities" (Riesman 1950: 19). He called this the "other-directed" 
personality (ibid.: 9). The "other-directed" individual- the product Of 
an affluent, mobile, consumerist society - was deeply concerned with 
his image and appearance; he continually reinvented and adjusted his 
public persona in an effort to please and impress others. Riesman noted 
the manifestations of this other-directed orientation in various cultural 
practices and texts of the time, from children's novels to stories and ads 
in women's magazines that dealt with "modes of manipulating the self 
in order to manipulate others," for the attainment of such "intangible 
assets" as prestige, acceptance and affection (ibid.: 106). 
This "other-direction" - an orientation toward appearances, sur-
faces, packaging, glamour, and perfecting and controlling one's image 
in the eyes of others - should be familiar to us, with its origins in the 
pre-Second World War era. There were, however, significant devel-
opments in postwar culture that escalated the emphasis on personal 
image and image management. By the 1950s, the number of white-
collar workers outnumbered blue-collar workers for the first time in 
US history. Labor power, more than ever, took the form of "personal-
ity" and "people skills." The burgeoning service occupations placed on 
their participants intense requirements for managed self-presentation -
in sociologist Erving Goffman's words, that "one give a perfectly homo-
geneous performance at every appointed time" (Goffman 1955: 56). 
The phrase "personal image" first entered popular culture in the 1960s. 
With willpower and focus, advised a 1962 business success manual 
titled The Magic Power of Putting Yourself Over with People, "you can 
have the kind of personal image you want," and through your image, 
"sell yourself' to others (Arnold 1962). 
The guiding theme of postwar advertising was that everyone and 
everything had an image that could be successfully marketed to any-
one if presented convincingly enough. Advertising surged in the 1950s. 
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By the mid-1950s, the United States was spending $9 billion annually 
to sell products (Moskowitz 2001: 157). As ever, product advertisements 
encouraged consumers to view themselves with the critical gaze of spec-
tators, as performers under the constant scrutiny of friends and strangers. 
Other "image industries" flourished; the affluent society generated and 
consumed media images in unprecedented volume. Newspaper circu-
lation reached historic highs (Young and Young 2004: 153). A paper-
back "revolution" in the 1950s made books available for only 25 cents 
(Burress 1989: 73). The cosmetics industry was selling over $1 billion a 
year, and the garment industry was producing $2 billion dollars' worth 
of goods annually (Koshetz 1952: F1; Breines 2001: 95). 
Celebrity culture flourished, and it spread beyond the realm of 
entertainment to virtually every other area of endeavor. The mass-
mediated "superstar" was emblematic of the age, obsessed as it was with 
images, entertainment, and fame. Celebrities knit together a national 
culture based on shared images -"Jackie's hairdo, Marilyn Monroe's 
pout, Marlon Brando's swagger" (Farber and Foner 1994: 49). As ever, 
the essence of celebrity remained style rather than substance. Modem 
celebrity rewarded those who had appealing lifestyles and personalities, 
and who could project those personalities in an alluring fashion. Since 
media attention - and little else - was the basis of fame, it remained an 
eminently democratic aspiration. Celebrities continued to serve as role 
models of successful self-presentation, and there was great fascination 
with the ways that stars publicized themselves, how they transformed, 
manipulated, and spun their images. The public was enthralled with 
"backstages," with the activities of publicists and press agents, and 
the inner workings of Hollywood and other image-making "factories" 
(Boorstin 1965: 194). 
. In his widely acclaimed 1962 book The Image: A Guide to Pseudo 
Events in America, Daniel Boorstin observed that the United States 
had entered an "age of images." Like Riesman, Boorstin lamented what 
he saw as the alienating effects of mass communication and mass con-
sumption, the vaunting of surfaces over depth, and the centrality of 
simulated, vicarious experiences to cultural life (Pells 1985: 225-56). 
Politics had become a form of shadow theater, enacted through tele-
vision clips, sound bytes, press conferences, and other staged "pseudo-
events," Boorstin (1965: 194) wrote. It was becoming a matter offaith 
that the right image could "elect a President or sell an automobile, a 
religion, a cigarette, or a suit of clothes" (ibid.: 192). "Before the age of 
images, it was common to think of a conventional person as one who 
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strove for an ideal of decency or respectability." Now one tried to "fit 
into the images found vividly all around him." "We have fallen in love 
with our own image, with images of our making, which turn out to be 
images of ourselves" (ibid.: 192). 
*** 
The state of image law and litigation reflected the growth of the media, 
its heightened sensationalism, and the image consciousness in the cul-
ture of the time. Legal protections for personal image, and one's right to 
control one's image, increased in the postwar era, as did Americans' use 
of the law to protect those interests. Libel assumed increasing prom-
inence in legal and popular culture, and privacy law and litigation 
expanded. 
At its 1953 meeting, the American Newspaper Publishers' 
Association noted that libel claims against newspapers were on the 
rise. Arthur Hanson, counsel for the ANPA, claimed that the number 
oflibel suits had grown by several100 percent in the 1950s (Rosenberg 
1995: 247). According to one torts treatise, libel suits had been far 
"more numerous" in the 1950s than in previous years (Miller 1952: 
191). There was great inflation in the size of judgments and claims; 
some plaintiffs were claiming that their reputations were worth mil-
lions (Rosenberg 1995: 247; Forde 2008: 113). 
Courts continued to expand the definition of a defamatory publica-
tion to include representations that were not necessarily harmful to a 
person's social relations, but that were nonetheless injurious to his feel-
ings about his image (Developments in the Law of Defamation 1956: 
881). As the law professor Edward Blaustein summarized in 1964, there 
was an "increasing tendency" in the law of defamation to go "beyond 
the traditional reaches" of the protection of reputation to protect "per-
sonal humiliation and degradation" (Blaustein 1964: 993 ). Law profes-
sor John Wade noted that "the law of defamation has been expanded 
to include certain situations where there was no real injury to plaintiff's 
reputation but he was held up to ridicule or otherwise subjected to 
mental disturbance" (Wade 1962: 1094 ). 
By the late twentieth century, the bulk of the money paid out in dam-
age awards in defamation suits went to "compensate for psychic injury, 
rather than any objectively verifiable damage to one's reputation," 
observed law professor Rodney Smolla ( 1986: 24). The tort's protected 
interest broadened from "extrinsic, community-based reputation" to 
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"freedom from psychic or emotional harm to the individual" (Bezanson 
1988: 541). The focus of the action, in many instances, is the "decline 
in self-reputation" suffered by the plaintiff. The actions for defamation 
and privacy were converging; courts were "assimilat[ing] defamation 
cases to privacy" (Kalven 1966: 334). 
*** 
In the 1950s, the privacy tort came into its own. The number of pri-
vacy cases more than doubled that of any previous decade (Pember 
1972: 147). By the 1960s, there were more than 300 reported privacy 
cases, most of them involving the media (Kalven 1972: 361). "How 
many more (privacy cases) are settled in lower courts or out of court 
cannot even be estimated," wrote Journalism Quarterly in 1953. "The 
number of cases can be said to be definitely increasing" (Davis 1953: 
187). By 1960, the invasion of privacy tort was "declared to exist by 
the overwhelming majority of American courts" (Prosser 1960: 389). 
In 1963, a forty-four-year-old mother, Flora Bell Graham, the wife of 
a chicken farmer from rural Cullman County, Alabama, attended the 
county fair with her sons, and she went with them into a fun house. As 
she left, her dress was blown up by air jets- part of the "fun." A pho-
tographer from the local paper got a snapshot, and the picture of the 
woman ran on the front page. Even though the picture was taken in a 
public place, the trial court made an award of several thousand dollars, 
upheld by the state's Supreme Court. "Not only was th[e] photograph 
embarrassing to one of normal sensibilities," the court concluded, but 
was "offensive to modesty or decency" to the point of being "obscene" 
(County Fair Picture 1964).15 
It was not only suggestive or explicit portrayals that invaded pri-
vacy. Courts found invasions of privacy in all manner of media depic-
tions that plaintiffs claimed to be embarrassing, offensive, or otherwise 
injurious to their public images. The film industry was a real "target 
for invasion of privacy lawsuits," noted one publishing trade journal 
in 1953 (Davis 1953: 187). A California trial court issued a $290,000 
judgment against the film company Loew's Inc over a complaint by a 
woman who was the model for an Army nurse in the film They Were 
Expendable. The court found that depicting her romance with a Navy 
lieutenant on screen was an invasion of her privacy (ibid.). 
15 Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So2d 474 (Ala. 1964 ). 
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Privacy cases continued to be brought- and won- over publications 
that were benign in most people's eyes, in some cases even complimen-
tary, albeit displeasing to the subjects of publicity. In the early 1960s, 
Warren Spahn, the famous baseball player, sued over an unauthorized 
biography that he claimed was too flattering. The biography depicted 
him as a war hero who had been awarded the Bronze Star. Spahn had 
served in the Army, but had not been decorated. The book also inac-
curately portrayed his relationship with his father, who appeared in the 
story as a kind mentor and coach, and it incorporated false, invented 
dialog. Spahn found all this to be offensive, sued for invasion of pri-
vacy, and was successful at trial. Spahn later told an interviewer that he 
was embarrassed at the way his military experience had been glorified 
and was concerned that people would think he planted the account 
to make himself look heroic (Yasser 2008: 49). The publication was 
enjoined and Spahn awarded damages. 16 
The "privacy" right to one's public image was widely supported, in 
both popular culture and in the legal world. The idea of a legal right to 
protect one's public image against unwanted or distorted media depic-
tions resonated with the cultural ideals in the image-conscious society. 
Privacy was the individual's "rightful claim ... to determine the extent 
to which he wishes to share himself with others," in the words of one 
legal scholar. Everyone had a right to "choose those portions of the 
individual which are to be made public" (Breckenridge 1970: 1-3). 
Wrote one federal judge, "in a society predicated on individual rights, 
each person should be entitled to choose the face he or she wishes to 
present to the public unless that right is waived or some other right is 
paramount" (Forer 1987: 19). 
*** 
The privacy right to control one's personal image was prized in postwar 
America, but freedom of speech had also become a core cultural and 
legal value. The student movement of the 1960s had begun with the 
famous Berkeley free speech protests, and the right to dissent, question 
authority, and challenge the status quo was a critical demand of the 
counterculture (Farber and Foner 1994: 196-8). In the era of Vietnam, 
the Pentagon Papers, anticommunist purges, and the public revelation 
of extensive government spying, political criticism was being described 
16 Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1966). 
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as a "public duty".17 The "crusading journalist," risking punishment to 
expose injustice, was romanticized in the popular culture of the time 
(Gajda 2009: 1039). 
The Supreme Court's protection of free speech was unprecedented. 
Between the end of the Second World War and the 1970s, the Court 
issued decisions that protected a wide range of previously proscribed 
material (Hale 1987: 3, Strossen 1996: 71-2). Almost three-fourths 
of the free speech cases that came before the Court in the 1950s and 
1960s were decided in favor of free expression (Strossen 1996: 69). The 
Court's opinions described free expression as an important personal lib-
erty, furthering "self-fulfillment," and the "right to autonomous control 
over the development and expression of one's intellect, tastes, and per-
sonalities."18 The ability to freely express one's thoughts, beliefs, and per-
sonal identity was seen as essential to the growth and enhancement of 
the individual (Sandel1998: 80). Decisions also emphasized the impor-
tance of freedom of speech and press to democratic self-governance 
through "public discussion" (New York Times v. Sullivan [1964]). With 
the public dependent on the mass media as a source of information 
about public affairs, "a broadly defined freedom of the press" was nec-
essary to "assure the maintenance of our political system and an open 
society."19 
In this free speech zeitgeist, courts often dismissed privacy suits 
against the media under the common law "matters of public interest" 
privilege. Fearing a "judicial censorship" of the press, courts continued 
to define the content of the popular media as synonymous with the 
"public interest." In this view, if something appeared in the "press"- a 
film, novel, television episode, or even tabloid or detective magazine -
by definition, it was a matter of public interest, and "newsworthy." The 
public had a "right to be informed," whether the information was mate-
' rial about a politician's home and family life or a sensationalistic article 
about a homicide in Official Detective Stories magazine. 20 
Every person, celebrity or not, surrendered one's right to privacy by 
becoming part of an event that was a "newsworthy" matter of pub-
lic concern, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, in the view of some 
17 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
18 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
19 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
20 Blount v. T.D. Pub. Corp., 423 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1967); Kapellas v. Koffman, 1 Cal. 3d 
20, 31, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969). 
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courts. A newspaper that ran a large picture of a murdered boy's decom-
posed body was not liable to the boy's parents. The court concluded 
that the boy, albeit unwillingly, became part of an event of "public 
interest" by virtue of being murdered and waived his right to privacy.21 
Likewise, given live television coverage, the paparazzi, and the increas-
ing presence of cameras in public, people were said to "assume the risk" 
of unwanted publicity whenever they went outside their homes. The 
dominant rule was that "photographers on public property may take 
pictures of anyone they want to, objection or not" (The Press: Freedom 
to Photograph 1954). 
In the seventy years after the famous Brandeis and Warren inven-
tion, the legal action for invasion of privacy, as the right to one's public· 
image, had developed, flourished, and been pruned back by courts that 
could not reconcile that right with American society's dependence on 
media images, and its commitment to freedom of expression. The his-
tory of American image law is a saga of simultaneous expansion and 
limitation- the increasing recognition of personal image rights over 
the course of the twentieth century, and at the same time, their restric-
tion by legal doctrines and concepts of freedom of speech. 
*** 
By the 1970s, the modern doctrines of the tort laws of image had been 
established, as had the "image-conscious sensibility." As this chapter 
has illustrated, the twentieth century witnessed the rise of a cultural 
attitude or outlook, rooted in the middleclass but not limited to it, in 
which the self is conceptualized in terms of images. Influenced by a vari-
ety of cultural forces, from the "image industries" to celebrity culture 
to the mobile and fluid conditions of modern, urban life, Americans 
became aware of having public images and being images: one's identity 
was embedded, at least in part, in the image or persona one strategically 
constructed and presented to others. In a world of crowds, surfaces, 
and distant and impersonal social relations, the ability to perfect and 
manage one's image came to be regarded as critical to social mobility, 
public recognition, and material success. Individuals from a variety of 
backgrounds and circumstances asserted that they owned their images, 
that they had an entitlement to their images and a right to control 
them, and that this prerogative was critical to their ability to live and 
21 Bremmerv. Journal-Tribune Pub. Co., 247 Ia 817, 76 N.W.2d 762, 766-67 {Ia, 1956). 
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function as free and self-determining individuals, and to pursue the 
fabled American Dream. 
The law both responded to and contributed to this focus on images 
and the rise of the image-conscious self. By the 1940s, as we have seen, 
a body of tort law protected the individual's public image, their ability 
to control this image, and their feelings about their image. We saw the 
expansion of litigation in these areas, and despite doubts and resist· 
ance among some sectors, widespread support for these laws - in the 
judiciary, among academics, in the public at large. Tort law became a 
venue for, and participant in, modem America's intense concerns with 
personal image. 
Personal image was legalized: images, and people's feelings about their 
images, came to be viewed as appropriate matters for legal intervention, 
regulation, and supervision. This is not to say that every person who 
was insulted, maligned, or misrepresented undertook legal action -
far from it. Most libels, "invasions of privacy," and other image-based 
harms never made it to a lawyer, never made it to court. They were 
endured, or dealt with informally. I am not suggesting that Americans 
have been litigious around their reputations and public images in any 
absolute sense. We can see, nonetheless, a growing "claims conscious-
ness" around personal image (Kalven 1966: 338). As the law expanded 
its authority over image-based harms and emotional harms, as privacy 
and libel litigation gained publicity and apparent social approval, there 
was a popular awareness that affronts to one's public persona could be 
dealt with legally, if one chose - that legal recourse was one avenue, 
among many, that could be pursued, and perhaps should be pursued. 
The effect of this legalization of image, I suggest, was to validate 
and reinforce the sense of possessiveness and protectiveness toward 
one's public image and persona. In acknowledging a right to control 
· one's image and one's feelings about one's image, the law affirmed the 
image-conscious sensibility. As in so many other areas of conduct, the 
law marked out a terrain of normative, socially acceptable behavior and 
feeling, through the reasonableness, or "reasonable person" standard 
(Green 1968: 241). Particularly in the latter half of the twentieth cen· 
tury, courts and juries often defined the reasonable person with respect 
to image as an individual who was conscious of, and quite sensitive to, 
their social appearance; who was likely to be hurt, perhaps deeply so, 
when publicized in a false, misleading, miscontextualized or humiliating 
manner - or in any fashion that sharply clashed with their own self-
image. While there was much disagreement as to the thickness of the 
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normal person's skin, and the free speech limitations on image rights, 
the law recognized emotional distress as a reasonable response to a tar· 
nished or distorted public persona, and deemed such injuries significant 
enough to merit recognition and recompense, although perhaps less 
so than some may have wished. This legal affirmation legitimated the 
seriousness toward personal image that was being cultivated and urged 
upon the public by the other cultural forces we have seen. Free speech 
limitations notwithstanding, American culture embraced the idea of a 
legal right to be vindicated and compensated for image-based harms, 
part of a broader, fundamental right to possess and control the self. 
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